Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage Choice by John Y. Campbell & Joao F. Cocco
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We would like to thank Deborah Lucas, François Ortalo-Magné, Todd Sinai, Joseph Tracy, three anonymous
referees, and the editor, Edward Glaeser, for helpful comments.  The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by John Y. Campbell and Joao F. Cocco.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given
to the source.Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage Choice
John Y. Campbell and Joao F. Cocco
NBER Working Paper No. 9759
June 2003
JEL No. G1, E4
ABSTRACT
A typical household has a home mortgage as its most significant financial contract. The form of this
contract is correspondingly important. This paper studies the choice between a fixed-rate (FRM) and
an adjustable-rate (ARM) mortgage. In an environment with uncertain inflation, a nominal FRM has
risky real capital value whereas an ARM has a stable real capital value. However an ARM can
increase the short-term variability of required real interest payments. This is a disadvantage of the
ARM for a household that faces borrowing constraints and has only a small buffer stock of financial
assets. The paper uses numerical methods to solve a life-cycle model with risky labor income and
borrowing constraints, under alternative assumptions about available mortgage contracts. While an
ARM is generally an attractive form of mortgage, a household with a large mortgage, risky labor
income, high risk aversion, a high cost of default, and a low probability of moving is less likely to
prefer an ARM. The paper also considers an inflation-indexed FRM, which removes the wealth risk
of the nominal FRM without incurring the income risk of the ARM, and is therefore a superior
vehicle for household risk management. The welfare gain from mortgage indexation can be very
large.
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The portfolio of the typical American household is quite unlike the diversiﬁed port-
folio of liquid assets discussed in ﬁnance textbooks. The major asset in the portfolio
is a house, a relatively illiquid asset with an uncertain capital value. The value of
the house generally exceeds the net worth of the household, which ﬁnances its home-
ownership through a mortgage contract to create a leveraged position in residential
real estate. Other ﬁnancial assets and liabilities are typically far less important than
the house and its associated mortgage contract.
The importance of housing in household wealth is illustrated in Figure 1. This
ﬁgure plots the fraction of household assets in housing and in equities against the
wealth percentile of the household. Poor households appear at the left of the ﬁgure
and wealthy households at the right. Data come from the 1989 and 1998 Survey
of Consumer Finances. The ﬁgure shows that middle-class American families (from
roughly the 40th to the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution) have more than
half their assets in the form of housing. Even after the expansion of equity ownership
during the 1990’s, equities are of negligible importance for these households.3
Academic economists have explored the eﬀects of illiquid risky housing on sav-
ing and portfolio choice (see for example Cocco 2001, Davidoﬀ 2002, Flavin and
Yamashita 2002, Fratantoni 2001, Goetzmann 1993, Hu 2001, Skinner 1994, and
Yao and Zhang 2001). Some have proposed innovative risk-sharing arrangements in
which households share ownership of their home with ﬁnancial institutions (Caplin et
al. 1997) or buy insurance against declines in local house price indexes (Shiller 1998,
Shiller and Weiss 1999) in order to reduce their exposure to ﬂuctuations in house
prices. Such arrangements have not yet been implemented on any signiﬁcant scale,
perhaps because the occupant of a single-family home has inadequate incentives to
maintain the home when he is not the sole owner, or because homeownership protects
households from ﬂuctuations in local rents (Sinai and Souleles 2003), or because of
3We are grateful to Joe Tracy for providing us with this ﬁgure. The methodology used to
construct it is explained in Tracy, Schneider, and Chan (1999) and Tracy and Schneider (2001).
Wealth is deﬁned as total assets, without subtracting liabilities and including all assets except
human capital and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. Households in the Survey of Consumer Finances
are sorted by this measure of wealth, then the median share in real estate and equity is calculated
separately for families in each percentile of the wealth distribution. The medians are smoothed
across neighboring percentiles in the ﬁgure. Equity holdings include direct holdings as well as
mutual funds, deﬁned-contribution retirement accounts, trusts, and managed accounts.
1barriers to innovation in retail ﬁnancial markets.
In this paper we consider a household that solely owns a house with an uncertain
capital value, ﬁnancing it with a mortgage. We turn attention to the form of the
mortgage contract, which can also have large eﬀects on the risks faced by the home-
owner. We view the choice of a mortgage contract as a problem in household risk
management, and we conduct a normative analysis of this problem. Our goal is to
discover the characteristics of a household that should lead it to prefer one form of
mortgage over another. We abstract from all other aspects of household portfolio
choice by assuming that household savings are invested entirely in riskless assets.
Mortgage contracts are often complex and diﬀer along many dimensions. But con-
ventional mortgages can be broadly classiﬁed into two main categories: adjustable-
rate (ARM) and nominal ﬁxed-rate (FRM) mortgages. In this paper we study the
choice between these two types of mortgages, characterizing the advantages and dis-
advantages of each type for diﬀerent households. We compare these conventional
mortgages with inﬂation-indexed ﬁxed-rate mortgages of the sort proposed by Fabozzi
and Modigliani (1992), Kearl (1979), Statman (1992) and others.
When deciding on the type of mortgage, an extremely important consideration
is labor income and the risk associated with it. Labor income or human capital is
undoubtedly a crucial asset for the majority of households. If markets are complete
such that labor income can be capitalized and its risk insured, then labor income
characteristics play no role in the mortgage decision. In practice, however, markets
are seriously incomplete because moral hazard issues prevent investors from borrowing
against future labor income, and insurance markets for labor income risk are not well
developed.
In this paper we solve a dynamic model of the optimal consumption and mortgage
choices of a ﬁnitely lived investor who is endowed with non-tradable human capital
that produces a risky stream of labor income. The framework is the buﬀer-stock
savings model of Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997), calibrated to
microeconomic data following Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999) and Gourinchas
and Parker (2002). The investor initially buys a house with a required minimum
downpayment, ﬁnancing the rest of the purchase with either an ARM or an FRM.
Subsequently the investor can reﬁnance the FRM, if the value of the house exceeds
the principal balance of the mortgage, by paying a ﬁxed cost.4 We can also allow the
4The ﬁxed cost represents some combination of explicit “points”, often charged at the initiation
2investor to take out a second loan, up to the point where total debt equals the value
of the house less the required downpayment, and we can allow for a ﬁxed probability
each period that the investor will move house. We ask how these options and other
parameters of the model aﬀect mortgage choice.
Our results illustrate a basic tradeoﬀ between several types of risk. A nominal
FRM, without a prepayment option, is an extremely risky contract because its real
capital value is highly sensitive to inﬂation. The presence of a prepayment option
protects the homeowner against one side of this risk, because the homeowner can call
the mortgage at face value if nominal interest rates fall, taking out a new mortgage
contract with a lower nominal rate. However this option does not come for free; it
raises the interest rate on an FRM and leaves the homeowner with a contract that
is expensive when inﬂa t i o ni ss t a b l e ,b u te x t r e m e l yc h e a pw h e ni n ﬂation increases as
occurred during the 1960’s and 1970’s. This wealth risk is an important disadvantage
of a nominal FRM.
An ARM, on the other hand, is a safe contract in the sense that its real capital
value is almost unaﬀected by inﬂation. The risk of an ARM is the income risk
of short-term variability in the real payments that are required each month. If
expected inﬂation and nominal interest rates increase, nominal mortgage payments
increase proportionally even though the price level has not yet changed much; thus
real monthly payments are highly variable. This variability would not matter if the
homeowner could borrow against future income, but it does matter if the homeowner
faces binding borrowing constraints. Constraints bind in states of the world with low
income and low house prices; in these states buﬀer-stock savings are exhausted and
home equity falls below the minimum required to take out a second loan. The danger
of an ARM is that it will require higher interest payments in this situation, forcing a
temporary but unpleasant reduction of consumption. We ﬁnd that households with
large houses relative to their income, volatile labor income, or high risk aversion are
particularly adversely aﬀected by the income risk of an ARM.
Our model also allows for real interest rate risk, the risk that the cost of borrowing
will increase during the life of a long-term loan. Merton (1973) pointed out that long-
term investors should be just as concerned about shocks to interest rates as about
of a mortgage contract, and implicit transactions costs (Stanton 1995). We do not allow households
to choose among mortgages oﬀe r i n gat r a d e o ﬀ of points against interest rates (Stanton and Wallace
1998). Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) and Chan (2001) emphasize that reﬁnancing can become
impossible if house prices fall below mortgage balances so that homeowners have negative home
equity.
3shocks to their wealth; as Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002) have emphasized, this
means that short-term debt is not a safe investment for long-term investors. The
same point applies to long-term borrowers. Long-term FRMs protect homeowners
against the risk that real interest rates will increase, whereas ARMs do not.
The mobility of a household and its current level of savings also aﬀect the form of
the optimal mortgage contract. If a household knows it is highly likely to move in the
near future, or if it is currently borrowing-constrained, the most appropriate mortgage
is more likely to be the one with the lowest current interest rate. Unconditionally, this
is the ARM, since the FRM rate incorporates a positive term premium and the cost
of the FRM prepayment option; but if the short-term interest rate is currently high
and likely to fall, the FRM might have a lower rate. Thus our model implies that
homeowners should respond to the yield spread between FRM and ARM mortgage
rates, which is driven by the yield spread between long-term and short-term bond
yields. When this yield spread is unusually high, more homeowners should take out
ARMs; when it is unusually low, more homeowners should take out FRMs.
One solution to the risk management problems identiﬁed in this paper is an
inﬂation-indexed FRM. This contract removes the wealth risk of the nominal FRM
without incurring the income and real interest rate risks of the standard ARM con-
tract. The inﬂation-indexed FRM should also have a lower mortgage rate than a
nominal FRM, since the real term structure is ﬂatter than the nominal term structure
and the option to prepay an inﬂation-indexed mortgage is less valuable. We cali-
brate our model to US interest data over the period 1962—1999 and ﬁnd large welfare
gains from indexation of FRMs. These results parallel the ﬁndings of Campbell and
Shiller (1996) and Campbell and Viceira (2001) that inﬂation-indexed bonds should
be attractive to conservative long-term investors.
It is interesting to compare our normative results with historical patterns in mort-
gage ﬁnancing, and with the advice that homeowners receive from books on personal
ﬁnance. The United States is unusual among industrialized countries in that the
predominant mortgage contract is a long-term nominal FRM, usually with a 30-year
maturity. The monthly interest rate survey of the Federal Housing Finance Board
shows that long-term nominal FRMs accounted for 70% of newly issued mortgages
on average during the period 1985-2001, while ARMs accounted for 30%. Nomi-
nal FRMs have a very large secondary market, whose liquidity has been supported
by US government policy over many decades, particularly through the government
agency GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association or “Ginnie Mae”), and
4the private but government-sponsored entities FNMA (Federal National Mortgage
Association or “Fannie Mae”) and FHLMC (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration or “Freddie Mac”). The liquidity of this market likely reduces the rates on
nominal FRMs and helps to account for their popularity in the United States.5
F i g u r e2p l o t st h ee v o l u t i o no ft h eF R Ms h a r eo v e rt i m e . T h eF R Ms h a r ei s
strongly negatively correlated with the level of long-term interest rates (the correlation
with the 10-year Treasury yield is -0.77 in levels and -0.57 in quarterly changes).
Accordingly the FRM share trended upward during the period 1985-2001 as interest
rates trended downward; it averaged around 60% in the late 1980’s and around 80%
i nt h el a t e1 9 9 0 ’ s . S u r p r i s i n g l yt h eF R Ms h a r ei sa l m o s tu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h ey i e l d
spread between 10-year and 1-year interest rates (the correlation is 0.10 in levels and
0.02 in quarterly changes).6
One explanation for the tendency of households to use FRMs when long-term
interest rates have recently fallen is that households believe long-term interest rates
to be mean-reverting. If declines in long-term interest rates tend to be followed by
increases, then it is rational to “lock in” a long-term interest rate that is low relative
to past history by taking out a FRM. Some personal ﬁnance books oﬀer advice
of this sort. Irwin (1996), for example, oﬀers the following tip: “When interest
rates are low, get a ﬁxed-rate mortgage and lock in the low rate” (p.143), while
Steinmetz (2002) advises “If you think rates are going up, get a ﬁxed-rate mortgage”
(p.84). The diﬃculty with this advice, of course, is that movements in long rates are
extremely diﬃcult to forecast. The expectations theory of the term structure implies
that changes in long-term bond yields should be almost unforecastable; while there
is some empirical evidence against this theory (see for example Campbell and Shiller
(1991) or Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 10)), it seems overambitious
for the average homeowner to try to predict movements in long-term interest rates.
5Woodward (2001) describes in detail how federal policy has supported the FRM market. Several
studies have found important liquidity eﬀects in mortgage markets. Cotterman and Pearce (1996)
ﬁnd a 25-40 basis point spread between private label mortgages and the conforming mortgages that
are securitized by FNMA and FHLMC, while Black, Garbade, and Silber (1981) and Rothberg,
Nothaft, and Gabriel (1989) ﬁnd that the initial securitization of mortgages by GNMA lowered
mortgage interest rates by 60-80 basis points.
6During 2002, the FRM share fell even while interest rates declined. This attracted the attention
of the business press as a departure from the historical pattern. See for example Ruth Simon, “Do
You Have the Wrong Mortgage? In Puzzling Move, Homeowners Flock to Riskier Variable Loans
Instead of Locking In Low Rates”, Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2002.
5Other recommendations of personal ﬁn a n c eb o o k sa r em o r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
normative results presented in this paper. Homeowners who expect to move within
a few years are often advised to take out ARMs to exploit the low initial interest
rate. Tyson and Brown (2000), for example, write: “Many homebuyers don’t expect
to stay in their current homes for a long time. If that’s your expectation, consider an
ARM. Why? Because an ARM starts at a lower interest rate than does a ﬁxed-rate
loan, you should save interest dollars in the ﬁrst two years of holding your ARM.”
(p.64). ARMs are also recommended for homeowners who are currently borrowing
constrained but expect their incomes to grow rapidly: “ARMs are best utilized...
when your cash ﬂow is currently tight but you expect it to increase as time goes on”
(Orman 1999, p.254); “Sometimes ARMs have lower initial loan costs. If cash is a
big consideration for you, look into them” (Irwin 1996, p.144).
Personal ﬁnance books do not explicitly distinguish diﬀerent types of risk as we
do in this paper. However some personal ﬁnance authors clearly think that income
risk and real interest rate risk are important for homeowners, because they describe
ARMs as risky assets and FRMs as safe: “An ARM can pay oﬀ, but it’s a gamble.
Sometimes there’s a lot to be said for something that’s safe and dependable, like a
ﬁxed-rate mortgage.” (Fisher and Shelly 2002, p. 319).
T h e r ei sal a r g ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r eo nm o r t g a g ec h o i c e . F o l l a i n( 1 9 9 0 )s u r v e y s
the literature from the 1980’s and earlier. Much recent work focuses on FRM pre-
payment behavior, and its implications for the pricing of mortgage-backed securities
(for example Schwartz and Torous 1989 and Stanton 1995). One strand of the liter-
ature emphasizes that households know more about their moving probabilities than
lenders do; this creates an adverse selection problem in prepayment that can be mit-
igated through the use of ﬁxed charges or “points” at mortgage initiation (Dunn and
Spatt 1985, Chari and Jagannathan 1989, Brueckner 1994, LeRoy 1996, Stanton and
Wallace 1998).
A few papers discuss the choice between adjustable-rate and ﬁxed-rate mortgages.
On the theoretical side, Alm and Follain (1984) emphasize the importance of labor
income and borrowing constraints for mortgage choice, but their model is determin-
istic and thus they cannot address the risk management issues that are the subject of
this paper. Stanton and Wallace (1999) discuss the interest-rate risk of ARMs, but
without considering the role of risky labor income and borrowing constraints. We are
not aware of any previous theoretical work that treats income risk and interest-rate
risk within an integrated framework as we do here. On the empirical side, Shilling,
6Dhillon, and Sirmans (1987) look at micro data on mortgage borrowing and estimate
a reduced-form econometric model of mortgage choice. They ﬁnd that households
with a more stable income and households with a higher moving probability are more
likely to use ARMs. These ﬁndings are consistent both with our theoretical model
and with the typical advice given by books on personal ﬁnance.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 lays out the model of
household choice, and section 2.2 calibrates its parameters. Section 3 compares alter-
native nominal mortgage contracts, while section 4 studies inﬂation-indexed FRMs.
Section 5 asks whether our results are robust to alternative parameterizations. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
72 A Life-Cycle Model of Mortgage Choice
2.1 Model speciﬁcation
Time parameters and preferences
We model the consumption and asset choices of a household, indexed by j,w i t ha
time horizon of T periods. We study the decision of how to ﬁnance the purchase of a
house of a given size Hj. That is, we assume that buying a house is strictly preferred
to renting–perhaps because of tax considerations–so that we do not model the
decision to buy versus rent. In addition, we do not study what determines the initial
choice of house size, and we assume that the household remains in a house of this size,
regardless of the path of household income. Thus we ignore the possibility that the
household can adjust to an income shock by moving to a larger or smaller house.7
In each period t, t =1 ,...,T, the household chooses real consumption of all goods
other than housing, Cjt. We assume preference separability between housing and
consumption. Since the size of the house and the utility derived from it are ﬁxed, we















where β is the time discount factor and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. The
household derives utility from terminal real wealth, Wj,T+1, which can be interpreted
as the remaining lifetime utility from reaching age T +1with wealth Wj,T+1.
The term structure of nominal and real interest rates
FRM and ARM mortgages diﬀer because nominal interest rates are variable over
time. This variability comes from movements in both the expected inﬂation rate and
7Cocco (2001) studies the choice of house size using a life-cycle model similar to the one in this
paper. Sinai and Souleles (2003) study the choice between renting and buying housing.
8t h ee xa n t er e a li n t e r e s tr a t e . W eu s et h es i m p l e s tm o d e lt h a tc a p t u r e sv a r i a b i l i t yi n
both these components of the short-term nominal interest rate, and allows for some
predictability of interest rate movements. Thus in our model there will be periods
when homeowners can rationally anticipate declining or increasing short-term nominal
interest rates, and thus declining or increasing ARM payments.
We write the nominal price level at time t as Pt. We adopt the convention that
lower-case letters denote log variables, thus pt =l o g ( Pt) and the log inﬂation rate
πt = pt+1 − pt. To simplify the model, we abstract from one-period uncertainty in
realized inﬂation; thus expected inﬂation at time t i st h es a m ea si n ﬂation realized
from t to t +1 . While clearly counterfactual, this assumption should have little
eﬀect on our comparison of nominal mortgage contracts, since short-term inﬂation
uncertainty is quite modest and aﬀects nominal ARMs and FRMs symmetrically.
Later in the paper we consider inﬂation-indexed mortgages; the absence of one-period
inﬂation uncertainty in our model will lead us to understate the advantages of these
mortgages.
We assume that expected inﬂation follows an AR(1) process. That is,
πt = µ(1 − φ)+φπt−1 + ²t, (2)
where ²t is a normally distributed white noise shock with mean zero and variance
σ2
². By contrast, we assume that the ex ante real interest rate is variable but serially
uncorrelated. The expected log real return on a one-period bond, r1t =l o g ( 1+R1t),
is given by:
r1t = r + ψt, (3)
where r is the mean log real interest rate and ψt is a normally distributed white noise
shock with mean zero and variance σ2
ψ.
We make the assumption that real interest rate risk is transitory for tractability.
Fama (1975) showed that the assumption of a constant real interest rate was a good
approximation for US data in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but it is well known that more
recent US data display serially correlated movements in real interest rates (see for
example Garcia and Perron 1996, Gray 1996, or Campbell and Viceira 2001). How-
ever movements in expected inﬂation are the most important inﬂuence on long-term
9nominal interest rates (Fama 1990, Mishkin 1990, Campbell and Ammer 1993), and
our AR(1) assumption for expected inﬂation allows persistent variation in nominal
interest rates.
The log nominal yield on a one-period nominal bond, y1t =l o g ( 1+Y1t),i se q u a l
to the log real return on a one-period bond plus expected inﬂation:
y1t = r1t + πt. (4)
To model long-term nominal interest rates, we assume that the log expectations hy-
pothesis holds. That is, we assume that the log yield on a long-term n-period
nominal bond, ynt =l o g ( 1+Ynt), is equal to the expected sum of successive log yields
on one-period nominal bonds which are rolled over for n p e r i o d sp l u sac o n s t a n tt e r m
premium, ξ:




This model implies that excess returns on long-term bonds over short-term bonds are
unpredictable, even though changes in nominal short rates are partially predictable.
Thus there are no predictably good or bad times to alter the maturity of a bond
portfolio, and homeowners cannot reduce their average borrowing costs by trying to
time the bond market.
Available mortgage contracts
At date one, household j ﬁn a n c e st h ep u r c h a s eo fah o u s eo fs i z eHj with a nominal
loan of (1 − λ)PH
j1H,w h e r eλ is the required down-payment and PH
j1 i st h ed a t eo n e
nominal price of the house. The mortgage loan is assumed to have maturity T,s o
that it is paid oﬀ by period T +1 .
If the household chooses a nominal FRM, and the date one interest rate on a FRM
with maturity T is Y F
T1, then in each subsequent period the household must make a









j=1(1 + Y F
T1)−j. (6)
Since nominal mortgage payments are ﬁxed at mortgage initiation, real payments
are inversely proportional to the price level Pt. This implies that a nominal FRM,
without a prepayment option, is a risky contract because its real capital value is
highly sensitive to inﬂation.
We allow for a prepayment option. A household that chooses an FRM may in
later periods reﬁnance at a monetary cost of ρ.L e tI
ρ
jt be an indicator variable which
takes the value of one if the household reﬁnances in period t, and zero otherwise. We
assume that a reﬁnancing household at date t obtains a new FRM mortgage with
the same principal as the remaining principal of the old mortgage, and with maturity
T − t +1such that by the terminal date T +1the mortgage will have been paid
down. We allow reﬁnancing to occur regardless of the level of house prices at time
t,a sw o u l db et h ec a s ew i t ha na u t o m a t i c a l l yr e ﬁnancing mortgage; thus we do not
impose a constraint that the reﬁnancing household’s home equity must exceed the
minimum downpayment.
We assume that the date t nominal interest rate on a FRM is given by:
Y
F
T−t+1,t = YT−t+1,t + θ
F, (7)
where θ
F is a constant mortgage premium over the yield on a (T −t+1)-period bond.
This premium compensates the mortgage lender for default risk and for the value of
the reﬁnancing option.
If the household chooses an ARM, the annual real mortgage payment, MA
jt,i s
given by the following. We write Djt for the nominal principal amount of the original








where ∆Dj,t+1 is the component of the mortgage payment at date t that goes to pay
down principal rather than pay interest. We assume that ∆Dj,t+1 is equal to the
average nominal loan reduction that occurs at date t in a FRM for the same initial
11loan. While this does not correspond exactly to a conventional ARM, it greatly
simpliﬁes the problem since by having loan reductions that depend only on time and
the amount borrowed, the proportion of the original loan that has been repaid is not
a state variable.
The date t n o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t eo na nA R Mi sa s s u m e dt ob ee q u a lt ot h es h o r t
rate plus a constant premium:
Y
A
1t = Y1t + θ
A. (9)
The ARM mortgage premium θ
A compensates the mortgage lender for default risk.
Labor income risk
The household is endowed with stochastic gross real labor income in each period,
Ljt, which cannot be traded or used as collateral for a loan. As usual we use a lower
case letter to denote the natural log of the variable, so ljt ≡ log(Ljt).H o u s e h o l dj’s
log real labor income is exogenous and is given by:
ljt = f(t,Zjt)+vjt + ωjt, (10)
where f(t,Zjt) is a deterministic function of age t and other individual characteristics
Zjt,a n dvjt and ωjt are stochastic components of income. Thus log income is the
sum of a deterministic component that can be calibrated to capture the hump shape
of earnings over the life-cycle, and two random components, one transitory and one
persistent. The transitory component is captured by the shock ωjt, an i.i.d. normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2
ω.T h e p e r s i s t e n t c o m -
ponent is assumed to be entirely permanent; it is captured by the process vjt,w h i c h
is assumed to follow a random walk:
vjt = vj,t−1 + ηjt, (11)
where ηjt is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with mean zero and vari-
ance σ2
η. These assumptions closely follow Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999) and
other papers on the buﬀer-stock model of savings.
12We allow transitory labor income shocks, ωjt, to be correlated with innovations
to the stochastic process for expected inﬂation, ²t, and denote the corresponding
coeﬃcient of correlation ϕ. To the extent that wages are set in real terms, this
correlation is likely to be zero. If wages are set in nominal terms, however, the
correlation between real labor income and inﬂation may be negative, and this can
aﬀect the form of the optimal mortgage contract.
Taxation
We model the tax code in the simplest possible way, by considering a linear taxa-
tion rule. Gross labor income, Lt, is taxed at the constant tax rate τ. We also allow
for mortgage interest deductibility at this rate.
House prices and second loans
The price of housing ﬂuctuates over time. Let pH
jt denote the date t real log price
of house j. Real house price growth is given by
∆p
H
jt = g + δjt, (12)
ac o n s t a n tg plus an i.i.d. normally distributed shock δjt with mean zero and variance
σ2
δ. To economize on state variables we assume that innovations to a household’s real
house price are perfectly positively correlated with innovations to the permanent
component of the household’s real labor income so that
δjt = αηjt, (13)
where α > 0. This assumption implies that states with low house prices are also states
with low permanent labor income; in these states an increase in required mortgage
payments under an ARM contract can require costly adjustments in consumption.
In the next section we use PSID data to judge the plausibility of this assumption.8
8A large positive correlation between income shocks and house prices is also present in Ortalo-
Magné and Rady (2001).
13H o u s ep r i c e sm a t t e ri no u rm o d e lb e c a u s ew ei m p o s et h er e a l i s t i cc o n s t r a i n t ,
emphasized by Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) and Chan (2001), that reﬁnancing
of a FRM is only possible if the value of the house, less the minimum downpayment,
exceeds the principal balance of the mortgage. In addition, we can extend the model
to allow households to obtain a second one-period loan to bring total debt up to the
value of the house less the minimum downpayment. Recall that Djt is the nominal
dollar amount of the original loan outstanding at date t. We allow households at time
t to borrow Bjt nominal dollars for one period subject to the constraint
Bjt ≤ (1 − λ)P
H
jtHj − Djt. (14)
That is, total borrowing cannot exceed the original proportion of house value that
could be borrowed at date one. We assume that the nominal interest rate on the
second loan is equal to Y1t plus a constant premium, θ
B.
Household default
In each period the household decides whether or not to default on the loan. In
case of default the bank seizes the house and the household is forced into the rental
market for the remainder of its life. We set the rental cost equal to the user cost of
housing plus a constant rental premium, θ
R. The real rental cost Zt for a house of
size H with price PH








where Y1,t is the one-period nominal interest rate, Et(∆pH
t+1 + π1,t+1) is the expected
proportional nominal change in the house price, and PH
t H is the date t value of
the house. The rental premium covers the moral hazard problem of renting, that
tenants have no incentive to look after a property so that maintenance becomes more
expensive. In addition, and contrary to interest payments on a mortgage loan, the
rental cost of housing is not tax-deductible, which increases the after-tax cost of
renting.
14Bank proﬁts
The date t real proﬁt of lenders of funds, or banks, depends on whether there is
default. For an ARM loan to a household with no second loan it is given by:
Πjt =
(PH







t is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if the household defaults
in period t and zero otherwise (of course this variable is not deﬁn e di nc a s et h e r eh a s
been default in a period prior to t). In case of default the bank seizes the house but
loses the outstanding mortgage principal. If there is no default the bank receives the
ARM premium on the outstanding loan. For a FRM the household can also reﬁnance
the loan, in which case interest payments cease but the bank receives the outstanding
mortgage principal.
Moving
We introduce moving in the model in the following simple manner: with proba-
bility p the household moves in each period. When this happens the household sells
the house, pays oﬀ the remaining mortgage, and evaluates utility of wealth using the
terminal utility function. This enables us to study the impact of the likelihood of
moving, or of termination of the mortgage contract, on mortgage choice.
Summary of the household’s optimization problem
In summary, the household’s control variables are (Cjt,B jt,I
ρ
jt,IZ
jt) at each date
t. The problem is somewhat simpler in the case of an ARM, because in this case
the reﬁnancing indicator variable I
ρ
jt is not a control variable. The vector of state










j <t ) is the level of nominal interest rates when the mortgage was initiated
or was last reﬁnanced, t
0
j is the period when the mortgage was initiated or was last
reﬁnanced, Wjt is real liquid wealth or cash-on-hand, Pt is the date t price level, vjt
15is the household’s permanent labor income, and SZ
jt is a state variable that takes the
value of one if there has been previous default and zero otherwise.
The equation describing the evolution of real cash-on-hand for an ARM when
there has not been previous default, and with no second loan, can be written as




1tDjt/Pt)(1 + R1,t+1)+( 1− τ)Lj,t+1, (17)
or when there has been previous default
Wj,t+1 =( Wjt − Cjt − Zjt)(1 + R1,t+1)+( 1− τ)Lj,t+1 , (18)
and similarly for a FRM.
Solution technique
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the ﬁnite nature of the problem
a solution exists and can be obtained by backward induction. We discretize the state
space and the choice variables using equally spaced grids in the log scale. The density
functions for the random variables were approximated using Gaussian quadrature
methods to perform numerical integration (Tauchen and Hussey 1991). The nominal
interest rate process was approximated by a two-state transition probability matrix.
The grid points for these processes were chosen using Gaussian quadrature. In period
T +1the utility function coincides with the value function. In every period t prior
to T +1 , and for each admissible combination of the state variables, we compute
the value associated with each combination of the choice variables. This value is
equal to current utility plus the expected discounted continuation value. To compute
this continuation value for points which do not lie on the grid we use cubic spline
interpolation. The combinations of the choice variables ruled out by the constraints of
the problem are given a very large (negative) utility such that they are never optimal.
We optimize over the diﬀerent choices using grid search.
162.2 Parameterization
We study the optimal consumption and mortgage choices of investors who buy a
house early in life. Adult age in our model starts at age 26 and we let T be equal to
30 years. For computational tractability, we let each period in our model correspond
t ot w oy e a r sb u tw er e p o r ta n n u a l i z e dp a r a m e t e r sa n dd a t am o m e n t sf o re a s eo f
interpretation. In the baseline case we assume an annual discount factor β equal to
0.98 and a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ equal to three. We will study how
t h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o na ﬀe c t sm o r t g a g ec h o i c e .
Inﬂation and interest rates
Parameter estimates for inﬂation and interest rates are reported in Table 1. Our
measure of inﬂation is the consumer price index. We use annual data from 1962
to 1999, time aggregated to two-year periods, to estimate equation (2). We ﬁnd
average inﬂa t i o no f4 . 6 %p e ry e a r ,w i t has t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no f3 . 9 % ,a n da na n n u a l
autoregressive coeﬃcient of 0.754. To measure the log real interest rate we deﬂate
the two-year nominal interest rate using the consumer price index. We measure
the variability of the ex-ante real interest rate by regressing ex post two-year real
returns on lagged two-year real returns and two-year nominal interest rates, and then
calculating the variability of the ﬁtted value. We obtain a standard deviation of 2.2%
per year, as compared with a mean of 2.0%. This standard deviation is surprisingly
high, which may be a result of overﬁtting in our regression; but since our assumption
that all real interest rate risk is transitory artiﬁcially diminishes the importance of
such risk, we use this high standard deviation to partially oﬀset this eﬀect. Our
results are not particularly sensitive to changes in the volatility of the real interest
rate.
In order to assess how well our model for the term structure matches the data we
have computed the annualized standard deviations of the two-year bond yield, the
ten-year bond yield, and the spread between them. The values we obtain are 5.3%,
1.9%,a n d3.5%, respectively. The corresponding values in the data are 3.1%, 2.9%,
and 0.7%. It appears that our model overstates the volatility of the short rate and
understates its persistence, which means that we understate the volatility of the long
rate level and overstate the volatility of the long-short yield spread.
In section 5, on alternative parameterizations we assess the beneﬁts of mortgage
17indexation when we calibrate our interest-rate process to a process characteristic of
the US in the 1983-1999 period. As expected, the estimated parameters (reported
in section 5) imply considerably lower inﬂation risk in this period.
Mortgage contracts, second loans and rental premium
Two important parameters of the mortgage contracts are the mortgage premiums,
θ
F and θ
A. It is natural to assume that θ
F ≥ θ
A. One can think of θ
A as a pure
measure of default risk, while θ
F contains both default risk and the value of the
prepayment option.
To estimate the mortgage premiums on the contracts we use data from the monthly
interest rate survey of the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) from January
1986 to December 2001. To estimate the mortgage premium on FRM contracts,
θ
F,w ec o m p u t et h ed i ﬀerence between interest rates on commitments for ﬁxed-rate
mortgages and the yield to maturity on 10-year treasury bonds. The average annual
diﬀerence over this period is 1.8%.
To estimate the mortgage premium on ARM contracts, θ
A, we compute the dif-
ference between the ARM contract rate and the yield on a 1-year bond over the same
sample period. The average annual diﬀerence is equal to 1.7%. This number may be
biased downwards by the fact that ARMs sometimes have low initial “teaser” rates
to lure households into the ARM commitment.
The diﬀerence between the ARM and FRM premiums is surprisingly small. This
may result in part from measurement error in the survey data or the short sample
period of the survey. It may also result from the liquidity of the FRM market which
has been supported by US government policy over many decades, particularly through
t h ea c t i v i t i e so fG N M Aa n dt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ ss p o n s o r s h i po fF N M A a n dF H L M C .
We set the term premium equal to 1.0%, the average yield spread between 10-year
and 1-year Treasury bonds over the period 1986—2001. This term premium increases
the average interest cost of FRMs relative to ARMs.
We assume a required downpayment of 20%, and we set the rental premium θ
Z
to 3.0%. In the baseline case we make θ
B inﬁnite and therefore do not allow the
homeowner to take out a second loan. We relax this restriction in section 5.
18House prices
We use house price data from the PSID for the years 1970 through 1992. As with
income the self assessed value of the house was deﬂated using the Consumer Price
Index, with 1992 as the base year, to obtain real house prices. We drop observations
for households who reported that they moved in the previous two years since the
house price reported does not correspond to the same house. In order to deal with
measurement error we drop the observations in the top and bottom ﬁve percent of
real house price changes.
We estimate the average real growth rate of house prices and the standard devi-
ation of innovations to this growth rate. Over the sample period real house prices
grew an average of 1.6% per year. Part of this increase is due to improvements in
the quality of houses, which cannot be separated from other reasons for house price
appreciation using PSID data. The annualized standard deviation of house price
changes is 11.5%, a value comparable to those reported by Case and Shiller (1989)
and Poterba (1991).
We consider two alternative house sizes. In the benchmark case the household
purchases a house costing $187,500 using a $150,000 mortgage and paying $37,500
down. (The downpayment is assumed to come from prior savings or transfers from
family members, rather than from current income.) In an alternative case, the
household purchases a smaller house costing $125,000 using a $100,000 mortgage and
a $25,000 downpayment.
Labor income
To estimate the income process, we follow Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999).
We use the family questionnaire of the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID)
to estimate labor income as a function of age and other characteristics. In order to
obtain a random sample, we drop families that are part of the Survey of Economic Op-
portunities subsample. Only households with a male head are used, as the age proﬁle
of income may diﬀer across male- and female-headed households, and relatively few
observations are available for female-headed households. Retirees, nonrespondents,
students, and homemakers are also eliminated from the sample.
Like Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
19(2003), we use a broad deﬁnition of labor income so as to implicitly allow for in-
surance mechanisms–other than asset accumulation–that households use to protect
themselves against pure labor income risk. Labor income is deﬁned as total reported
labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers compensation, social secu-
rity, supplemental social security, other welfare, child support and total transfers
(mainly help from relatives), all this for both head of household and if present his
spouse. Observations which still reported zero for this broad income category were
dropped.
Labor income deﬁned this way is deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index, with
1992 as the base year. The estimation controls for family-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The
function f(t,Zjt) is assumed to be additively separable in t and Zjt.T h ev e c t o rZjt of
personal characteristics, other than age and the ﬁxed household eﬀect, includes mar-
ital status, household composition, and the education of the head of the household.9
Figure 3 shows the ﬁt of a third order polynomial to the estimated age dummies for
singles and married couples with a high school education but no college degree. We
u s et h e s ea g ep r o ﬁles for our calibration exercise. Average annual income for married
couples is about 40% higher than income for singles, starting at around $23,000 and
peaking at $32,000. This means that a house of given size is larger relative to income
if it is owned by a single person.
The residuals obtained from the ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of log labor income on
f(t,Zjt) can be used to estimate σ2
η and σ2




jt ≡ ljt − f(t,Zjt). (19)
Equation (10) implies that
l
∗
jt = vjt + ωjt. (20)
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences:
9Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2001) estimate separate age proﬁles for diﬀerent
educational groups. They also estimate diﬀerent income processes for households whose heads are
employed in diﬀerent industries, or self-employed. In this version of the paper, we focus on a single





j,t−1 = vjt − vj,t−1 + ωjt − ωj,t−1 = ηjt + ωjt − ωj,t−1. (21)
We consider several alternative methods for calibrating the standard deviations of
the permanent and transitory shocks to income. One approach is to use the standard
deviation of income innovations from (21), and the correlation between innovations to
income and real house price growth, to obtain estimates for the standard deviations
of ηjt and ωjt. The estimated correlation is 0.027, with a p-value of 2%. Recall
that in the model, and for tractability, we have assumed that real house price growth
is perfectly positively correlated with innovations to the persistent component of
income, and has zero correlation with purely transitory shocks. This assumption,
and the standard deviation of ηjt+ωjt−ωj,t−1,i m p l yt h a tση and σω are 0.35% and
16.3% respectively. This estimate of ση, the standard deviation of permanent income
shocks, seems too low. The reason is probably that measurement error biases our
estimate of the correlation between house price and income growth downwards.
An alternative approach is to use household level data on income growth over
several periods to estimate ση and σω. Following Carroll (1992) and Carroll and
Samwick (1997), Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999) estimate that ση and σω are
10.3% and 27.2% respectively. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2003) have reported
similar numbers.10
These numbers may be somewhat inﬂated by measurement error in the PSID. A
large standard deviation for permanent income growth is particularly problematic for
our model of mortgage choice because we assume a house of a ﬁxed size and ignore
the possibility that the household will choose to move to a larger or smaller house.
T h i si m p l i e sf o re x a m p l et h a to u rm o d e lw i l lt e n dt oo v e r p r e d i c td e f a u l tr a t e sw h e n
permanent income is volatile.
To avoid this diﬃculty we use a third calibration approach. We assume that
all shocks to permanent labor income are aggregate shocks, so that idiosyncratic
income risk is purely transitory. This assumption is consistent with the fact that
aggregate labor income appears close to a random walk (Fama and Schwert 1977,
Jagannathan and Wang 1996). In this case ση can be estimated as in Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (1999) by averaging across all individuals in our sample and taking the
10There is a large literature in empirical labor economics that estimates similar parameters, some-
times allowing them to vary over time. See for example Abowd and Card (1989), Gottschalk and
Moﬃtt (1994), or MaCurdy (1982).
21standard deviation of the growth rate of average income. Following this procedure
we estimate ση equal to 2.0%. For our baseline case we set σω equal to 14.1% (20%
over two years), which implies a correlation of house price growth with total income
growth of about 0.1. Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of these decisions, we are
careful to do sensitivity analysis with respect to the income growth parameters. We
consider a higher transitory standard deviation of 24.8% (35% over two years) in the
tables reported below, and in addition we have recomputed some results for a higher
permanent standard deviation of 5% with similar results to those reported.
In the baseline case we set the correlation between transitory labor income shocks
and innovations to expected inﬂation, ϕ,e q u a lt oz e r o .
Taxation
The PSID contains information on total estimated federal income taxes of the
household. We use this variable to obtain an estimate of τ. Dividing total federal
taxes by our broad measure of labor income and computing the average across house-
holds, we obtain an average tax rate of 10.3%. This number underestimates the
eﬀect of taxation because the PSID does not contain information on state taxes, and
because our model abstracts from the progressivity of the income tax. To roughly
compensate for these biases we set τ equal to 20%. All the calibrated parameters
are summarized in Table 1.
223 Alternative Nominal Mortgages
We now use our model to compare ﬁxed and adjustable rate nominal mortgages. We
do so by calculating optimal consumption and reﬁnancing plans, and the associated
lifetime expected utilities, under alternative FRM and ARM contracts. We are par-
ticularly interested in the eﬀects of house size, income risk, and the level of income on
behavior and welfare. Accordingly we consider two alternative house sizes–$125,000
and $187,500, corresponding to mortgages of $100,000 and $150,000, respectively–
two levels of transitory income risk–annual standard deviations of 0.141 and 0.248–
and two income levels–calibrated for a couple and a single person.
One way to get a sense for the size of these mortgages in relation to income is to
calculate the ratio of total mortgage payments to income, both in the ﬁrst year of
t h em o r t g a g ea n da v e r a g e do v e rt h el i f eo ft h em o r t g a g e . W eh a v ed o n et h i sf o rt h e
ARM, averaging across diﬀerent levels of interest rates. For a couple, the payment on
a $100,000 mortgage amounts to 36% of income in the ﬁrst year and 16% of income
on average over the life of the mortgage, while the payment on a $150,000 mortgage is
53% of income initially and 24% of income on average. For a single, these mortgages
are more burdensome. A $100,000 mortgage costs 50% of income initially and 22%
on average, while a $150,000 mortgage is an extreme case that costs 75% of income
initially and 33% on average.
As a ﬁrst step towards a welfare analysis, Figure 4 plots the distribution of realized
lifetime utility, based on simulation of the model across one thousand households.
Each household is assumed to have to ﬁnance a $150,000 mortgage on a $187,500
home using either an ARM, or an FRM with a $1,000 reﬁnancing cost. In the top
panel of the ﬁgure the household has a couple’s income, while in the bottom panel
the household has a smaller single person’s income. In both cases the lower standard
deviation of income growth, 0.141, is assumed.
Figure 4 shows that ARMs have substantial advantages for most households. For
couples, an ARM delivers higher utility everywhere in the utility distribution. For
singles, with lower income relative to house size, households in the upper part of the
utility distribution are better oﬀ with an ARM, but a few households at the lower
end of the distribution are substantially worse oﬀ. These results reﬂect the chief
disadvantage of an ARM, the cash-ﬂow risk that ARM payments will rise suddenly,
exhausting buﬀerstock savings and forcing an unpleasant cutback in consumption.
This risk is important when the mortgage is large relative to income.
23Default
The cash-ﬂow risk in ARM payments also implies that the proportion of house-
holds who choose to default on each loan tends to be higher under an ARM than under
a FRM. Default rates are extremely low for couples, but Figure 5 plots cumulative
default rates for singles with low income risk (dashed lines) and high income risk
(solid lines) respectively. It is important to note that these default rates are obtained
from simulating the behavior of households who diﬀer in their history of shocks to in-
terest rates, labor income and house prices. Households choose to default when faced
with negative labor income shocks, so that buﬀerstock savings become low, and with
negative house price shocks, so that home equity becomes negative. In a simulation
scenario in which house prices and labor income shocks are mainly positive (negative)
d e f a u l tr a t e sa r el o w e r( h i g h e r ) . F i g u r e5s h o w sc u m u l a t i v ed e f a u l to v e rt h el i f ec y c l e .
Since the risk in mortgage payments is higher early in life when buﬀer-stock savings
are smaller, default occurs mainly within the ﬁrst eight years of the contract.
There are some diﬀerences in the circumstances that trigger default under each
mortgage contract. While low labor income and house prices trigger default for both
types of contract, households with ARMs choose to default when current interest
rates and therefore current mortgage payments are high. They do so because default
allows them to avoid paying down the principal of their mortgage, and this reduction
in payments is particularly valuable when interest rates are high. Households with
FRMs, on the other hand, choose to default when current interest rates are low and
expected to rise. In these circumstances borrowing constraints are more severe under
the FRM contract than in the rental market, because the FRM mortgage payment is
based on the long-term interest rate while the rental payment is based on the current
short-term interest rate.
Reﬁnancing
F i g u r e5a l s os h o w st h ec u m u l a t i v er e ﬁnancing of FRMs by singles with low income
risk. The reﬁnancing rate is slightly higher for singles with high income risk, and
for couples, because these households accumulate larger savings and thus are more
readily able to aﬀord the $1,000 reﬁnancing cost. Over the life of the mortgage, about
45% of households reﬁnance their mortgages; almost all of this reﬁnancing activity
takes place within the ﬁr s t2 0y e a r so ft h em o r t g a g e ,s i n c el a t er e ﬁnancing reduces
interest payments on a smaller principal balance for fewer years but incurs the same
24ﬁxed cost as early reﬁnancing. The timing of reﬁnancing is somewhat sensitive to
t h ec o n s t r a i n tw eh a v ei m p o s e d ,t h a th o m e o w n e r sm u s th a v ep o s i t i v eh o m ee q u i t yi n
order to reﬁnance. If we relax this constraint we get higher reﬁnancing in the very
early years of the mortgage, but the diﬀerence diminishes over time and is only about
1% after 12 years. This reﬂects the fact that house prices increase on average, while
outstanding mortgage principal diminishes, so that very few households are likely to
have persistently negative home equity.
Consumption behavior
Table 2 reports the average consumption growth rate and the standard deviation
of consumption growth for households with ARMs, nominal FRMs that allow reﬁ-
nancing, and nominal FRMs without a reﬁnancing option. The top panel of the table
is for a couple, while the bottom panel is for a single. Within each panel, we consider
a small or large house, and low or high income risk. Average consumption growth
rates are very similar for all mortgages, since they depend largely on the hump-shaped
proﬁle of labor income in the presence of borrowing constraints. In one case with
a large house relative to income the average consumption growth rate is higher for
an ARM, reﬂecting precautionary savings to guard against the cash-ﬂow risk of the
ARM. The form of the mortgage has a larger eﬀect on the volatility of consumption
growth. Volatility is lowest with an ARM, higher with a reﬁnancing FRM, and high-
est with a non-reﬁnanceable FRM. These numbers reﬂect the dominance of wealth
risk over income risk in determining consumption volatility over the life cycle.
Welfare analysis
Table 3 summarizes the welfare implications of these numbers. The table reports
the welfare provided by a FRM, with or without a reﬁnancing option, relative to an
ARM. We calculate welfare using a standard consumption-equivalent methodology.
For each mortgage contract we compute the constant consumption stream that makes
the household as well oﬀ in expected utility terms, and then measure the change in
this equivalent consumption stream across mortgage contracts. In all the cases we
consider, the ARM is the best available mortgage contract. The welfare consequences
of this can be very large, reﬂecting the importance of the mortgage decision in the
ﬁnancial life of a household. If we consider a couple with low income risk and a large
$187,500 house as a benchmark case, the couple is 5.96% worse oﬀ with a nominal
25FRM that allows cheap reﬁnancing, and 6.79% worse oﬀ with a FRM that prohibits
reﬁnancing.
T h ew e l f a r ea d v a n t a g eo ft h eA R Md i m i n i s h e sw h e nt h eh o u s ei sl a r g er e l a t i v et o
income and when income is volatile. In the extreme case of a single with high income
risk and a large house, the household is only 1.03% worse oﬀ with a reﬁnanceable
F R Mt h a nw i t ha nA R M . T h i sr e ﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h ec a s h - ﬂow risk of an ARM is
disproportionately more important when labor income is risky and the house is large
relative to income.
By comparing welfare levels across FRMs with alternative reﬁnancing costs, we
can obtain the value of the option to reﬁnance. In the benchmark case this option
is worth 0.83% of consumption; it becomes more valuable when the house is large
relative to income, and when income is risky. Note that these numbers assume a
ﬁxed FRM rate even while changing the cost of reﬁnancing, and thus they do not
impose a zero-proﬁt condition on mortgage lenders.
All the numbers in Table 3 are averages across states of the world with high and
low interest rates. We have also calculated expected utility conditional on an initial
interest rate. As one would expect, the ARM is even more advantageous if the
interest rate is initially low, since in this case the ARM has a lower cost in the early
years when borrowing constraints are most severe. The FRM is more attractive if the
interest rate is initially high; in the benchmark case a couple will slightly prefer an
ARM even with a high initial interest rate, but a single will strongly prefer a FRM.
Thus our model implies that households’ ﬁnancing decisions should be sensitive to
the slope of the term structure. As we discussed in the introduction, the time-series
behavior of US mortgage ﬁnancing does not match this prediction. However our
ability to explore this issue is limited by the fact that our discretized model allows
only two possible levels of interest rates.
Bank proﬁts
U s i n g( 1 6 )w eh a v ec a l c u l a t e dt h ea v e r a g ea n n u a lp r o ﬁt of lenders of funds under
each mortgage contract, assuming that the bank borrows funds at the one-period
riskless interest rate. In the benchmark case of a couple with low income risk and a
large house, the average annual proﬁt is $745 for the ARM and $1218 for a reﬁnance-
able FRM. The higher average proﬁto nt h eF R Mc o m e sf r o mt h et e r mp r e m i u m
that banks earn by borrowing short and lending long; of course, this term premium
26can be regarded as compensation for the risk that banks take when they mismatch
the maturity of their borrowing and lending.
274I n ﬂation-Indexed Mortgages
In this section we investigate the welfare properties of inﬂation-indexed mortgages. In
principle an inﬂation-indexed FRM can oﬀer the wealth stability of an ARM, together
with the income stability of an FRM; it should therefore be a superior vehicle for
household risk management.
We consider inﬂation-indexed FRM contracts in which the interest rate is ﬁxed
in real terms. We study the welfare properties of a standard inﬂation-indexed FRM
contract, with constant real mortgage payments, and also those of an inﬂation-indexed
m o r t g a g ew h o s er e a lp a y m e n t sd i m i n i s ha tt h ea v e r a g er a t eo fi n ﬂation. We do so
because our investor is borrowing constrained; one of the advantages of the standard
inﬂation-indexed FRM contract, relative to the nominal FRM and ARM contracts, is
that real payments are lower early in life, when borrowing constraints are more severe.
This advantage of the standard inﬂation-indexed contract is conceptually distinct
from the risksharing advantage of indexation. Thus, to obtain a pure measure of the
risksharing advantage of indexation we consider an inﬂation-indexed mortgage whose
real payments diminish at the average rate of inﬂation.
Inﬂation-indexed mortgage terms
If in period one household j chooses an inﬂation-indexed FRM with ﬁxed real
payments, and the current real interest rate on an inﬂation-indexed FRM contract
with maturity T is RI
T1, then in each subsequent period the household must make a










Real mortgage payments are ﬁxed at mortgage initiation, and nominal payments
increase in proportion to the price level Pt. Thus, unlike a nominal FRM, the real
capital value of an inﬂation-indexed mortgage is not sensitive to inﬂation.
For the inﬂation-indexed mortgage contract we ignore the possibility of reﬁnanc-
ing. Given our assumption that real interest rate variation is transitory, the gains
from reﬁnancing in our model would be fairly small, and even a small monetary reﬁ-
nancing cost would prevent households from exercising their option. In reality, even
28with persistent real interest rates, the possibility of reﬁnancing an inﬂation-indexed
contract is likely to be only a minor feature of the contract, given the low volatility
of the real interest rate compared with that of nominal yields.




T−t+1,t = RT−t+1,t + θ
I, (23)
where θ
I i sac o n s t a n tm o r t g a g ep r e m i u mo v e rt h ey i e l do na(T − t +1 ) -period real
bond, RT−t+1,t, which is determined by the expectations theory of the term structure
applied to log real interest rates. We assume that there is no log term premium
for long-term real bonds, that is, that the real term structure is ﬂat on average.
This is consistent with the observed behavior of real yields on Treasury inﬂation-
protected securities since their issue in 1997 (Roll 2003). Since we do not allow for
the possibility of reﬁnancing the inﬂation-indexed FRM contract we set θ
I equal to
the ARM premium of 1.7%. This premium compensates the mortgage lender for the
initiation cost of the mortgage and for default risk.
In the inﬂation-indexed mortgage with real payments which diminish at the aver-









t is the date t real mortgage payment and µ is average inﬂation. The interest
rate or internal rate of return for this mortgage contract is assumed to be equal to
that for the standard inﬂation-indexed FRM.
Consumption behavior, default, and bank proﬁts
The standard inﬂation-indexed mortgage with constant real payments eases the
household’s borrowing constraints. The real payments under this contract are lower
than the required real payments on nominal mortgages early in life, when borrowing
constraints are more severe. A measure of the degree to which investors are borrowing
constrained is consumption growth. Table 4 shows that in the benchmark case the
average consumption growth rate under the inﬂation-indexed contract with constant
29real payments is only 0.8% compared to 2.0% with an ARM or a nominal FRM.
Because the inﬂation-indexed mortgage allows households to remain in debt later in
life, it increases the eﬀect of income risk on consumption; thus the standard deviation
of consumption growth is actually higher with this contract than with an ARM.
The inﬂation-indexed mortgage with declining real payments has a much smaller
eﬀect on average consumption growth. There is some reduction in the average
consumption growth rate for households with high income risk and large houses,
reﬂecting the fact that known real mortgage payments require smaller buﬀerstocks and
generate less precautionary saving than the random real payments required by ARMs.
The major eﬀect of an inﬂation-indexed mortgage with declining real payments is to
reduce the volatility of consumption growth, since this mortgage eliminates both the
wealth risk of the nominal FRM and the income risk of the ARM.
The inﬂation-indexed FRM also reduces default risk. For the parameter values we
have considered, households with inﬂation-indexed mortgages never default. Average
annual proﬁts of lenders are $1081 for the standard inﬂation-indexed mortgage, and
$971 for the mortgage with declining real payments. These proﬁts are higher than
those for the ARM. In equilibrium these lower default rates and higher proﬁts might
be translated into lower inﬂation-indexed mortgage premiums, which would further
beneﬁt households.
Welfare analysis
Figure 4 plots the distribution of realized lifetime utility for households with
inﬂation-indexed FRMs with constant or declining real payments. The ﬁgure shows
that the welfare gains of inﬂation-indexed mortgages are substantial for both cou-
ples and singles. The gains are particularly large for households at the bottom of
the welfare distribution, but there are beneﬁts to households across the distribution.
The inﬂation-indexed mortgage with constant real payments is always superior to the
mortgage with declining real payments.
Table 5 shows the average welfare gains of the inﬂation-indexed mortgages relative
to the ARM in the form of standard consumption-equivalent variations. For ease of
reference the earlier comparison of the nominal FRM with the ARM is repeated here.
In the benchmark case of a couple with a $187,500 house and low income risk, the
inﬂation-indexed mortgage with constant real payments oﬀers a welfare gain over an
ARM equivalent to 3.95% of consumption. The welfare gain increases with house
30size and with income risk, since ARMs are particularly problematic with large houses
and risky income. In the extreme case of a single with a large house and high income
risk, the welfare gain of inﬂation indexation exceeds 36% of consumption.
Comparing the two inﬂation-indexed contracts, we see that the average welfare
gains of the contract with declining real mortgage payments are considerably smaller
than those of the mortgage contract with ﬁx e dr e a lp a y m e n t s ,b u tt h e yr e m a i npo s i t i v e
in every case we consider. In the benchmark case Table 5 shows that households
are on average 0.91% better oﬀ with a declining inﬂation-indexed FRM than with an
ARM. Again the welfare gains increase dramatically with house size and income risk.
These results imply that with substantial inﬂation risk of the sort we have esti-
mated for the 1962—1999 period, the risksharing advantages of indexation are very
large. Households would be able to manage their lifetime risks much more eﬀectively
if they had access to inﬂation-indexed mortgage contracts. Of course, these results
depend on the parameters we have estimated. In the next section we assess the ben-
eﬁts of mortgage indexation for alternative parameterizations, including an income
process in which nominal wages are temporarily sticky, and an interest-rate process
characteristic of the US in the recent period of declining inﬂation.
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Sticky nominal wages
When nominal wages are inﬂation-indexed, or equivalently when wages are ﬁxed
in real terms, the correlation between real labor income shocks and inﬂation shocks
is zero. We have assumed this in our benchmark parameterization. However, in a
world where implicit contracts tend to ﬁx nominal, but not real wages, the correlation
between inﬂation shocks and real labor income shocks is negative. In such a world
households may demand nominal mortgage contracts because their wage contracts
are nominal. To explore this coordination feature of nominal contracts we compute
the welfare beneﬁts of inﬂation-indexed mortgages when nominal wages are sticky.
Table 6 repeats the welfare comparison of nominal and inﬂation-indexed FRMs
with ARMs for several alternative speciﬁcations. We consider the benchmark case
of a couple with a large $187,500 house and low income risk. The ﬁrst row of
the table repeats the numbers from Table 5 for this case. The second row shows the
average welfare gains of nominal and inﬂation-indexed FRMs for a negative correlation
coeﬃcient of -1 between temporary real labor income shocks and inﬂation innovations.
In the presence of negative correlation, a nominal ARM becomes much less attractive
because positive inﬂation shocks drive up nominal interest rates and increase mortgage
payments at times when real labor income is temporarily low. A nominal FRM
becomes relatively more attractive, although for the benchmark case reported in
Table 6 it does not dominate the ARM.
Negative correlation makes an inﬂation-indexed mortgage less attractive relative
to a nominal FRM. The welfare diﬀerence between the inﬂation-indexed FRM with
declining real payments and the nominal FRM is 6.87% in the benchmark case with
a zero correlation, but only 4.68% with a correlation of -1. However the inﬂation-
indexed mortgage becomes more attractive relative to the ARM, which is particularly
disfavored by nominal wage stickiness.
While these results are qualitatively unsurprising, it is striking that temporary
nominal wage stickiness does not reverse the welfare ordering we found in the previ-
ous section, that inﬂation-indexed FRMs dominate ARMs, which in turn dominate
nominal FRMs. To reverse that ordering we would need to assume nominal sticki-
ness in the permanent component of labor income, which would imply that inﬂation
32shocks permanently reduce real labor income. Such an assumption is much more
extreme than the temporary nominal stickiness we consider here.
T h eV o l c k e r - G r e e n s p a nm o n e t a r yp o l i c yp e r i o d
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Campbell and Viceira (2001) report con-
siderably lower inﬂation risk during the period since 1983 in which Federal Reserve
Chairmen Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan have brought US inﬂation under control.
We now assess the beneﬁts of mortgage indexation when we calibrate our interest-rate
process to a process characteristic of the US in the 1983-1999 period. For this period
we ﬁnd lower average inﬂation (3.4% as compared with 4.6%), less volatile inﬂation (a
standard deviation of 1.2% as compared with 3.9%), less persistent inﬂation (an au-
toregressive parameter of 0.41 as compared with 0.75), a higher average real interest
rate (3.1% as compared with 2.0%), and a less volatile real interest rate (a standard
deviation of 1.6% as compared with 2.2%).
The third row of Table 6 changes the interest-rate parameters to those we calibrate
for the 1983-1999 period. The ﬁrst column shows that nominal FRMs are less
attractive relative to ARMs than was the case in our benchmark model. Evidently
the stabilization of inﬂation and interest rates has reduced the income risk of ARMs
relatively more than the wealth risk of FRMs. The second and third columns show
that inﬂation-indexed FRMs remain superior mortgage contracts, but the welfare
gain is extremely small for the inﬂation-indexed FRM with declining real payments.
It appears that the Volcker-Greenspan monetary policy has reduced the pure risk
management advantages of inﬂation-indexed bonds to a low level.
Second loans
We now study how allowing homeowners to take out second loans, if they have
positive home equity, aﬀects the beneﬁts of mortgage indexation. The fourth row of
Table 6 shows the welfare gains for a second loan premium, θ
B,o f1 %i na n n u a lt e r m s .
For tractability, in this case we eliminate the prepayment option on the nominal FRM.
We see that the beneﬁts of constant real payments are smaller when second loans are
allowed, since these loans are an alternative way to relax the household’s borrowing
constraints. However second loans do not entirely eliminate the income risk of ARMs,
because low house prices may coincide with low income and high inﬂation, in which
33case second loans are unavailable precisely when they would be most valuable. Thus
our basic results survive the addition of second loans to our model.
Moving probability
We have also solved our model assuming a moving probability equal to 0.10,
meaning that the household moves on average once every ten years. Recall that in
all the cases reported in earlier tables, the probability of moving is equal to zero.
We ﬁnd that the welfare gain of an ARM over a nominal FRM is higher when the
m o v i n gp r o b a b i l i t yi sh i g h e r .I fah o m e o w n e rk n o w sh ei sh i g h l yl i k e l yt om o v ei nt h e
n e a rf u t u r e ,h ei sm o r el i k e l yt ou s et h ek i n do fm o r t g a g et h a th a st h el o w e rc u r r e n t
interest rate. On average, this is the ARM or the inﬂation-indexed FRM since the
nominal FRM has a higher yield spread that reﬂects the slope of the nominal term
structure.
C o n s u m p t i o ni nd e f a u l t
Our results are sensitive to the assumption that we make about consumption in
the event of a mortgage default. In the model we assume that in case of default
the bank seizes the house and the household is forced into the rental market for the
remainder of its life. We set the rental premium equal to the user cost of housing plus
a constant rental premium, θ
R, which in the benchmark parameterization is equal
to 3%. The sixth and seventh rows of Table 6 consider lower and a higher values
for the rental premium of 2% and 4% respectively. We interpret these as roughly
capturing the eﬀects of diﬀerent default costs or exemption levels in the event of
personal bankruptcy. From Table 6 we see that cheaper default makes a nominal
FRM less attractive relative to an ARM, because it mitigates the income risk of the
ARM. The beneﬁts of FRM indexation are also reduced but remain substantial.
Naturally, the cheaper is default the higher is the default rate.
These results suggest that in states or countries where bankruptcy is relatively
cheaper one should observe, ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of households choos-
ing ARMs. However we do not adjust the ARM premium θ
A to compensate lenders
for variations in the default rate caused by variations in the rental premium, and thus
our results do not capture the full general equilibrium eﬀect of the bankruptcy code.
34Impatient and risk-averse households
In the eighth row of Table 6 we consider impatient investors with a higher time
discount rate and a correspondingly smaller time discount factor of 0.90. Such
investors accumulate a smaller buﬀer-stock of liquid ﬁnancial assets, so they default
more often and are more aﬀected by the wealth risk of nominal FRMs and the income
risk of ARMs. They gain more from inﬂation-indexation, even if real payments
decline over time. They particularly beneﬁt from the postponed payments of an
inﬂation-indexed FRM with constant real payments.
In the ninth row of the table, we increase the risk aversion coeﬃcient from 3 to 5.
This causes households to become more concerned about the income risk of ARMs.
The welfare advantage of ARMs over nominal FRMs diminishes, and the beneﬁts of
inﬂation-indexation increase. Much of the gain from inﬂation—indexation comes from
improved risk management, but these households also have a strong preference for
smooth consumption so they beneﬁt from declining real mortgage payments.
Higher standard deviation of persistent income shocks
The tenth row of Table 6 shows the results for a higher standard deviation of
p e r m a n e n ti n c o m es h o c k se q u a lt o5%. The results are qualitatively similar to those
for the benchmark case. The main quantitative diﬀerence is a reduced beneﬁto fa n
inﬂation-indexed mortgage with constant real payments. This change is explained
b yt h ef a c tt h a tw i t hr i s k yp e r m a n e n ti n c o m e ,t h eo p t i o nt od e f a u l tb e c o m e sm o r e
valuable for the ARM and nominal FRM contracts relative to the inﬂation-indexed
mortgage with constant real payments. Once again we do not adjust the ARM or
FRM premium for variations in default caused by the change in the volatility of in-
come, and thus our results reﬂect only a partial equilibrium, not a general equilibrium
analysis.
ARM cap and ﬂoor
In the eleventh row of Table 6 we consider a hybrid ARM in which there is a cap
of 2% on the annual increase in the interest rate, and a lifetime cap of 6% on the
cumulative interest rate increase after mortgage initiation. These terms are fairly
35standard ones for a hybrid ARM. The hybrid ARM is more attractive than either
a straight ARM or a nominal FRM, as it mitigates income risk while still limiting
wealth risk. The beneﬁts of mortgage indexation are smaller in comparison to a
hybrid ARM, and shrink to 7 basis points for an inﬂation-indexed mortgage with
declining real payments.
In practice, ARMs often have more complicated terms including a low initial teaser
rate. A teaser rate enables an ARM to capture some of the beneﬁts of an inﬂation-
indexed mortgage with constant real payments, but we do not attempt to capture the
full richness of available ARM contracts here.
Correlation of income and interest rates
Our benchmark model assumes that shocks to income growth are uncorrelated
with shocks to real interest rates. If we assume instead that income growth is
negatively correlated with real interest rates, this exacerbates the income risk of
ARMs, since income will tend to be low precisely when interest rates are high and
required ARM mortgage payments are high. The twelfth row of Table 6 shows
that with a correlation of -0.2 between income and real interest rates, nominal and
inﬂation-indexed FRMs become slightly more attractive relative to ARMs.
Term premium in the real term structure
The last row of Table 6 assumes that the term premium ξ of 1% applies to the real
term structure as well as the nominal term structure. In this case the spread between
long-term nominal and real interest rates is caused only by expected inﬂation and does
not include an inﬂa t i o nr i s kp r e m i u m . T h i si n c r e a s e st h ec o s to fa ni n ﬂation-indexed
mortgage relative to a nominal mortgage, and reduces the beneﬁto fi n d e x a t i o n .
Under this assumption an ARM looks attractive as a way for a homeowner to avoid
paying the term premium.
Reﬁnancing from an ARM to a FRM
Finally, we consider an alternative speciﬁcation in which we allow households
who choose a nominal ARM to subsequently reﬁnance into a nominal FRM. Recall
36that our baseline speciﬁcation compares a nominal ARM to a nominal FRM, without
allowing households to switch between the two. In practice, and even though there
are transaction costs associated with switching between diﬀerent types of mortgages,
it is possible to do so. The complexity of our model prevents us from considering a
period-by-period decision to switch mortgages. However, we can study the welfare
eﬀe c t so fa l l o w i n gao n et i m es w i t c hf r o man o m i n a lA R Mt oan o m i n a lF R M . I tm a y
be the case that ARM borrowers ﬁnd it optimal to choose the ARM when interest
rates are low, but plan to switch to a FRM if and when interest rates increase.
The solution to this alternative speciﬁcation requires that at each date t and
for each combination of the state variables, we compare the utility of remaining an
ARM borrower to the utility of switching to the FRM contract. More precisely, let
Vt(Xt;FRM) denote the lifetime utility of becoming an FRM borrower at date t,w h e n
the vector of state variables is given by Xt. Assuming a zero switching cost, the house-
hold will at date t switch to the FRM if and only if Vt(Xt;FRM) >V t(Xt;ARM),
where Vt(Xt;ARM) is the lifetime utility of remaining an ARM borrower with the
option to switch to the FRM in a subsequent period.
To solve for the optimal mortgage choices under this alternative speciﬁcation,
we set the parameters equal to their benchmark values and the switching cost to
zero. For these parameters most borrowers prefer an ARM and never switch to a
FRM. There are 1.3% of households who start oﬀ with an ARM and later on switch
to a FRM when current interest rates are high. However, not all households ﬁnd
it optimal to switch to the FRM when current rates are high; only those with low
current income and ﬁnancial wealth do so. The intuition for this result is simple: when
current interest rates are high the ARM implies a larger current mortgage payment
than the FRM. Those consumers who are more borrowing constrained ﬁnd it optimal
to pay the higher average premium on the FRM in exchange for the lower current
mortgage payments. This result illustrates once more the importance of borrowing
constraints for mortgage choice. As consumers grow older the labor income proﬁle
becomes ﬂatter and households become less borrowing constrained. For this reason
the beneﬁts of switching to the FRM contract are lower. This explains our ﬁnding
that for the baseline parameters all the switching from the ARM to the FRM takes
place before age 38.
We also study the welfare eﬀects of allowing consumers to switch from the ARM
to the FRM. We compute the mean welfare gain delivered by the ARM with the
option to switch to the FRM, relative to the baseline nominal ARM contract. We
37ﬁnd a modest welfare gain of 0.27%,r e ﬂecting the small number of households that
choose to make this switch.
386C o n c l u s i o n
The problem of mortgage choice is both basic and complex. It is basic because almost
every middle-class American faces this choice at least once in his or her life. It is
complex because it involves many considerations that are at the frontier of ﬁnance
theory: uncertainty in inﬂation and interest rates, borrowing constraints, illiquid
assets, uninsurable risk in labor income, and the need to plan over a long horizon.
Despite the complexity of the problem, it is important for ﬁnancial economists to
try to oﬀer scientiﬁcally grounded advice. If ﬁnancial economists avoid the topic,
homeowners may be guided by unwise commercial or journalistic advice; for example
they may be urged to time the bond market by predicting the direction of long-term
interest rates. Mortgage choice should not be left to specialists in real estate, but
should be treated as an aspect of household risk management, a topic that lies at the
heart of ﬁnance.
In this paper we have shown that the form of the mortgage contract can have large
eﬀects on household welfare. We begin by comparing pure forms of the standard
nominal ARM and FRM contracts. FRM contracts expose households to wealth
risk, while ARM contracts expose them to income risk: the risk that borrowing
constraints will bind more severely when high interest rates coincide with low income
and house prices. While the exact levels of welfare depend on the particular premia
we have assumed for ARM and FRM mortgages, we can draw general conclusions
about the types of households that should be more likely to use ARMs. Households
with smaller houses relative to income, more stable income, lower risk aversion, more
lenient treatment in bankruptcy, and a higher probability of moving should be the
households that ﬁnd ARMs most attractive.
Interestingly, these results match quite well with empirical evidence reported by
Shilling, Dhillon, and Sirmans (1987). These authors look at micro data on mortgage
borrowing and estimate a reduced-form econometric model of mortgage choice. They
ﬁnd that households with co-borrowers and married couples (whose household income
is presumably more stable) and households with a higher moving probability are more
likely to use ARMs.
We have also investigated the welfare properties of innovative inﬂation-indexed
mortgage contracts. An inﬂation-indexed FRM can oﬀer the wealth stability of an
ARM together with the income stability of an FRM, so it is a superior vehicle for
39household risk management. Using US data from the period 1962—1999 we ﬁnd very
large welfare gains from the availability of an inﬂation-indexed mortgage contract.
Some of these gains arise from the reduced mortgage payments early in the life of
the mortgage that are implied by a constant real payment as opposed to a constant
nominal payment. Even if we remove this advantage by requiring real payments that
decline at the expected rate of inﬂation, we still ﬁnd substantial welfare gains from
indexation.
This ﬁnding raises the question of why inﬂation-indexed mortgages are not more
commonly used. There are several possible answers to this question. First, the yield
spreads between inﬂation-indexed Treasury securities and nominal Treasury securi-
ties have been extremely low, generally below 2%, since inﬂation-indexed Treasury
securities were introduced in 1997 (Roll 2003). This suggests that investors have a
high degree of conﬁdence that inﬂation will remain low in the future, and that the
inﬂation risk premium is low. When we calibrate our interest-rate model to the
period since 1983 in which inﬂation has been relatively well controlled, or when we
assume a zero inﬂation risk premium, we ﬁnd smaller risk management beneﬁts of
indexation. Second, we ﬁnd that hybrid ARMs with nominal interest rate caps can
improve signiﬁcantly over pure ARMs. These ARMs reduce the beneﬁts of inﬂation-
indexation.
Third, inﬂation-indexed mortgages can cause the outstanding principal of the
mortgage to increase over time in nominal terms (although not in real terms). Finan-
cial advisers frequently warn against such “negative amortization”, without making
any distinction between real and nominal debt. Irwin (1996), for example, writes
“Another trap has to do with negative amortization. Some of the adjustable loans
keep the monthly payments down by adding the interest to the principal. In other
words, you end up owing more than you borrowed!” Even more colorfully, Tyson
and Brown (2000) write “Negative amortization has the potential to be a personal
ﬁnancial neutron bomb. It destroys the borrower without harming the property. If
you’re oﬀered an ARM with negative amortization, emphatically say NO!”11 Suspi-
cion of negative amortization may have inhibited acceptance of innovative mortgage
contracts that might reduce the income risk of standard ARMs.
Although our model captures many of the important factors that should inﬂuence
11Steinmetz (2002) oﬀers a more nuanced view, stating that “Negative amortization is not inher-
ently bad”. However he, like the other authors quoted here, does not try to distinguish the real
value of a debt from its nominal value.
40mortgage choice, it remains oversimpliﬁed in several important respects. First, we
have assumed that households remain in a house of ﬁx e ds i z eu n l e s st h e ya r er a n -
domly forced to move, in which case we evaluate their welfare using a terminal utility
function. Second, related to this we assume a relatively low volatility of permanent
income growth in order to avoid large mismatches between household income and
house size. Third, our model is too stylized to capture teaser rates and other special
features of many mortgages that are oﬀered in the marketplace. Fourth, we work
in partial equilibrium and do not attempt to use zero-proﬁt conditions for mortgage
lenders to solve for equilibrium mortgage premia. We believe there is room for further
research to model these issues in a more satisfactory manner.
We have calibrated our model to match basic features of the US mortgage mar-
ket. Other countries have mortgage markets that diﬀer in important respects. For
example, long-term nominal ﬁxed-rate mortgages are almost unknown in the UK and
Canada. An interesting area for future research will be to relate these international
diﬀerences in prevailing mortgage contracts to diﬀerences in the risk management
problem that households face.
The concept of income risk that we emphasize in this paper has interesting im-
plications for other areas of ﬁnance. Corporations, for example, must consider the
risk that short-term or ﬂoating-rate debt will require high interest payments in cir-
cumstances where internal cash ﬂow and collateral are low and external ﬁnancing is
expensive. Here as in the problem of mortgage choice, borrowing constraints both
complicate and enrich standard models of risk management.
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47Table 1: Calibrated and estimated parameters
Description Parameter Value
Risk aversion γ 3
Discount factor β .98
House size ($ thousands) H 125, 187.5
Downpayment ratio λ .20
Tax rate τ .20
Mean log inﬂation µ .046
S.d. of log inﬂation σ(π1t) .039
Autoregression parameter φ .754
Mean log real yield r .020
S.d. of real log yield σ(r1t) .022
Nominal FRM premium θ
F .018
Term premium ξ .010
Reﬁnancing cost ($ thousands) ρ 1, ∞
ARM premium θ
A .017




Mean real house price growth exp(g + σ2
δ/2) .016
S.d. of log real house price growth σδ .115
S.d. of transitory income shocks σω .141, .248
S.d. of persistent income shocks ση .020
Corr. trans. income and inﬂation shocks ϕ .000
All parameters are in annual terms. The interest rate measure is the one-year
Treasury bond rate from 1962 to 1999. The income and house price data are from the
PSID from 1970 through 1992. Families that were part of the Survey of Economic
O p p o r t u n i t i e sw e r ed r o p p e df r o mt h es a m p l e .L a b o ri n c o m ei ne a c hy e a ri sd e ﬁned as
total reported labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers compensation,
social security, supplemental social security, other welfare, child support, and total
transfers, all this for both head of household and if present his spouse. Labor income
and reported house prices were deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index.Table 2: Consumption growth with nominal mortgages
∆ct σ(∆ct)
A R MF R MF R MA R MF R MF R M
Reﬁnancing Yes No Yes No
Panel A: Couple
H = 125.0,σω = .141 1.5 1.5 1.5 12.1 13.6 13.7
H = 125.0,σω = .248 2.2 2.2 2.2 17.1 18.6 18.7
H = 187.5,σω = .141 2.0 2.0 1.9 13.9 15.6 15.9
H = 187.5,σω = .248 2.8 2.8 2.8 19.4 20.7 20.9
Panel B: Single
H = 125.0,σω = .141 1.9 1.9 1.8 13.5 15.2 15.5
H = 125.0,σω = .248 2.8 2.8 2.8 17.6 18.8 19.0
H = 187.5,σω = .141 3.0 2.9 2.8 17.9 19.5 20.0
H = 187.5,σω = .248 4.1 4.1 4.1 22.4 24.2 24.7
This table shows average annual consumption growth, for goods other than hous-
ing, the standard deviation of annual consumption growth under diﬀerent mortgage
contracts and for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. The data are obtained by simu-
lating the model in section 2. Annual average consumption growth and the standard
deviation of annual consumption growth are obtained by dividing the two-year val-
ues by two and square root of two, respectively. The FRM contract can allow for
reﬁnancing at a $1,000 cost, or can prohibit reﬁnancing. Panel A shows the results
for households composed of a couple, and Panel B shows the results for households
composed of a single individual.Table 3: Welfare analysis of nominal mortgages
FRM Reﬁnancing
Reﬁnancing Yes No Option
Panel A: Couple
H = 125.0,σω = .141 -6.34 -6.84 0.50
H = 125.0,σω = .248 -5.72 -6.32 0.59
H = 187.5,σω = .141 -5.96 -6.79 0.83
H = 187.5,σω = .248 -5.40 -6.31 0.91
Panel B: Single
H = 125.0,σω = .141 -5.77 -6.51 0.74
H = 125.0,σω = .248 -5.43 -6.20 0.76
H = 187.5,σω = .141 -5.71 -7.29 1.58
H = 187.5,σω = .248 -1.03 -3.16 2.13
This table shows the mean welfare gain delivered by a nominal FRM, with and
without reﬁnancing at a $1,000 cost, relative to an ARM. The data are obtained
by simulating the model in section 2. Welfare is reported in the form of standard
consumption-equivalent variations. We weight the diﬀerent states by the ergodic
or steady-state distribution. For each mortgage contract we compute the constant
consumption stream that makes the household as well oﬀ in expected utility terms.
Utility losses are then obtained by measuring the change in this equivalent consump-
tion stream across mortgage contracts. Panel A shows the results for households
composed of a couple, and Panel B shows the results for households composed of a
single individual. The last column shows the value of the option to reﬁnance obtained
as the welfare diﬀerence for the reﬁnancing and no reﬁnancing versions of the FRM.Table 4: Consumption growth with inﬂation-indexed mortgages
∆ct σ(∆ct)
ARM Inﬂation-indexed FRM ARM Inﬂation-indexed FRM
Constant Declining Constant Declining
Panel A: Couple
H = 125.0,σω = .141 1.5 0.8 1.5 12.1 11.7 12.0
H = 125.0,σω = .248 2.2 1.5 2.1 17.1 17.4 18.2
H = 187.5,σω = .141 2.0 0.8 1.9 13.9 12.9 14.4
H = 187.5,σω = .248 2.8 1.6 2.6 19.4 18.5 19.1
Panel B: Single
H = 125.0,σω = .141 1.9 0.8 1.8 13.5 12.5 13.5
H = 125.0,σω = .248 2.8 1.7 2.7 17.6 15.9 17.6
H = 187.5,σω = .141 2.9 0.8 2.6 17.9 14.7 17.5
H = 187.5,σω = .248 4.1 1.9 3.7 22.4 18.4 22.2
This table shows average annual consumption growth, for goods other than hous-
ing, the standard deviation of annual consumption growth under diﬀerent mortgage
contracts and for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. A standard ARM contract is
compared with two alternative inﬂation-indexed FRMs, one with constant real pay-
ments and one with real payments that decline at the average rate of inﬂation. The
data are obtained by simulating the model in sections 2 and 4. Annual average
consumption growth and the standard deviation of annual consumption growth are
obtained by dividing the two-year values by two and square root of two, respectively.
Panel A shows the results for households composed of a couple, and Panel B shows
the results for households composed of a single individual.Table 5: Welfare analysis of inﬂation-indexed mortgages
Nominal FRM Inﬂation-indexed FRM
Constant Declining
Panel A: Couple
H = 125.0,σω = .141 -6.34 1.40 0.12
H = 125.0,σω = .248 -5.72 2.22 0.24
H = 187.5,σω = .141 -5.96 3.95 0.91
H = 187.5,σω = .248 -5.40 7.40 2.39
Panel B: Single
H = 125.0,σω = .141 -5.77 3.49 0.67
H = 125.0,σω = .248 -5.43 6.69 1.69
H = 187.5,σω = .141 -5.71 15.86 7.30
H = 187.5,σω = .248 -1.03 36.42 16.05
This table shows the mean welfare gain delivered by a nominal FRM and by an
inﬂation-indexed FRM, with constant real payments and with real payments which
diminish at the average rate of inﬂation, relative to an ARM. The data are obtained
by simulating the model in sections 2 and 4. Welfare is reported in the form of stan-
dard consumption-equivalent variations. We weight the diﬀerent states by the ergodic
or steady-state distribution. For each mortgage contract we compute the constant
consumption stream that makes the household as well oﬀ in expected utility terms.
Utility losses are then obtained by measuring the change in this equivalent consump-
tion stream across mortgage contracts. Panel A shows the results for households
composed of a couple, and Panel B shows the results for households composed of a
single individual.Table 6: Welfare analysis under alternative parameterizations
Nominal FRM Inﬂation-indexed FRM
Constant Declining
1. Benchmark -5.96 3.95 0.91
2. Correlated income and inﬂation (ϕ = −1.00) -2.87 5.16 1.81
3. 1983-1999 parameters -6.94 1.01 0.02
4. Lower second loan premium (θ
B = 1%) -6.40 1.57 0.97
5. Higher moving probability (p = 10%) -6.60 8.94 0.86
6. Lower rental premium (θ
Z =2 % ) -6.08 3.83 0.85
7. Higher rental premium (θ
Z =4 % ) -5.79 4.14 1.09
8. Higher time discount rate (β =0 .90) -6.49 12.46 1.46
9. Higher risk aversion (γ =5 ) -1.33 8.12 4.58
10. More volatile permanent income (ση =5 % ) -5.11 2.17 0.90
11. Hybrid ARM contract -6.75 3.09 0.07
12. Correlated income and real rates -5.90 4.02 0.97
13. Term premium in the real term structure -5.96 -1.34 -3.72
This table shows the mean welfare gain delivered by a nominal FRM and by an
inﬂation-indexed FRM, with constant real payments and with real payments which
diminish at the average rate of inﬂation, relative to an ARM for diﬀerent parameteri-
zations. The data are obtained by simulating the model in sections 2 and 4. The ﬁrst
row shows the results for our benchmark case, which is a couple needing to ﬁnance
a house of $187,500 and facing labor income risk σω = .141. The second shows the
results for a correlation between transitory labor income and inﬂation shocks equal to
minus one. The third row shows the results when the parameters of the inﬂation and
real interest rate processes are calibrated using data for the 1983-1999 period. The an-
nual parameters are: µ = .034, σ(π1t)=.012, φ = .412, r = .031,a n dσ(r1t)=.016.
In the fourth row we allow homeowners to take out second loans if they have positive
home equity, with a second loan premium of 1%.T h e ﬁfth row shows the results for
a probability of moving equal to 10%. The sixth and seventh rows show the results
for a lower and a higher rental premium in case of default. The eighth row shows
the results for a higher time discount rate, corresponding to a lower time discount
factor of 0.90. The ninth row shows the results for a higher coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion. The tenth row shows the results for a higher standard deviation forpermanent income shocks. The eleventh row shows the results for a hybrid ARM
characterized by a 2% cap per year and a 6% lifetime cap. The twelfth row shows
the results for a correlation of income growth and real interest rate shocks equal to
−0.2. The last row shows the results assuming that the term premium of 1% is in
the real term structure rather than the nominal term structure. 
 
 
Figure 1: Portion of Household Assets in Corporate Equity and Real Estate by Wealth 
Percentile, 1989 and 1998. The data are from the 1989 and 1998 Survey of Consumer 


















Figure 1: Portion of Household Assets in Corporate Equity 








































Figure 2: FRM share. This figure plots the percentage of conventional single-family 
mortgages originated by major lenders with fixed rates. The data is from the monthly 
interest rate survey of the Federal Housing Finance Board from January 1985 to 
December 2001. This figure also plots the 1-year Treasury rate, the 10-year Treasury rate 
and the yield spread between 10-year and 1-year interest rates.  
 

























































































Figure 3: Labor income profile. This figure plots a fitted third-order polynomial to the 
estimated age dummies for households composed of single individual and for a couple.  
The data are from the PSID for the years 1970 through 1992. We use a broad definition 
of labor income, defined as total reported labor income plus unemployment 
compensation, workers compensation, social security, supplemental social security, other 
welfare, child support and total transfers (mainly help from relatives), all this for both 
head of household and if present his spouse. Observations which still reported zero for 
this broad income category were dropped. In order to obtain a random sample we 
dropped families that are part of the Survey of Economic Opportunities subsample.  
 
































































ARM FRM Indexed - Declining Indexed - FixedFigure 4: Benchmark utility distribution. This figure shows various percentiles of the 
distribution of realized utility when we simulate the model for 1,000 households. Panel 
shows the results for households composed of a couple and panel B for households 
composed of a single individual. The parameters of the model are given in Table 1, with 
the size of the house that needs to be financed equal to $187,500.  The figure illustrates 
utility for an ARM and a nominal FRM with refinancing cost of $1,000, an inflation-
indexed FRM whose real payments which diminish at the average  rate of inflation, and 














































Figure 5: Cumulative default and mortgage refinancing. This figure shows the cumulative 
proportion of investors who choose to default under the FRM and ARM contracts for a 
household composed of a single individual and for two levels of labor income risk.  The 
parameters of the model are given in Table 1, with with the size of the house that needs to 
be financed equal to $187,500. The figure also shows the cumulative proportion of 







































































ARM Default FRM Default
ARM Default - Large Inc Risk FRM Default - Large Inc Risk
FRM Refinancing